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Abstract
The Goulart Administrations (1961-1964), which consisted of a parliamentary period 
and a presidential period, are considered typical examples of populism in Brazil. The 
literature usually defines economic policies advanced by these administrations as “he-
sitating”, “irrational” or “ambiguous.” We use a credibility model to argue that there is 
actually a consistent pattern in the manner in which economic policy was conducted. 
The credibility of the economic policies is defined to be the subjective probability that 
the government is following a monetary rule. Early on, the administrations enacted 
inflation-fighting measures. However, these policies were costly, and the administrations 
abandoned the course of austerity. As a result, their credibility was diminished, and 
attempts to achieve stabilization failed.
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Resumo
O governo Goulart (1961-1964), em suas fases parlamentarista e presidencialista, é 
considerado um exemplo típico do populismo no Brasil. A literatura sobre o período 
costuma definir a política econômica como hesitante, irracional ou ambígua. Neste 
trabalho, utiliza-se um modelo de credibilidade para explicar a condução da política 
econômica nas duas fases do governo. A credibilidade é definida como a probabili-
dade subjetiva com que os agentes avaliam o compromisso do governo para com as 
medidas de estabilidade por ele anunciadas, formalizadas por uma regra monetária. 
Nas duas fases o governo inicia com medidas de combate à inflação. À medida que 
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o tempo passa, como resultado dos custos associados a esta política, a austeridade é 
abandonada, a credibilidade diminui e as tentativas de estabilização falham.
Palavras-Chave
populismo, credibilidade, Brasil, João Goulart
1. Introduction
The Goulart Administrations (1961-1964), which included a par-
liamentary and a presidential period, are usually considered typical 
examples of populism in Brazil. Populism is a phenomenon that has 
been present in several Latin American countries since the 1930s. 
The meaning, the historical motivations and the different manifes-
tations of populism are subjects of intense debate, which has preven-
ted a consensus conceptualization from forming; however, there are 
common traits that are widely mentioned by most analysts. These 
analysts usually highlight markedly political phenomena, such as the 
existence of charismatic leadership, a direct relationship between 
this leadership and the people, the dismissal of intermediaries, the 
redistributive rhetoric and the symbiosis between demagogical and 
authoritarian political practices. Dornbusch and Edwards (1991, p.9) 
define “economic populism” as “an approach to economics that em-
phasizes growth and income redistribution and deemphasizes the 
risks of inflation and deficit finance, external constraints, and the 
reaction of economic agents to aggressive nonmarket policies.” The 
authors consider the most important characteristic of populist go-
vernment to be “policymakers that explicitly reject the conservative 
paradigm and ignore the existence of any type of constraints on 
macroeconomic policy” (p.9). However, an analysis of the economic 
policies of the Goulart Administrations allows us to detect certain 
patterns that may help clarify their behavior in terms of populism 
and better understand the populist phenomenon in terms of eco-
nomics. More specifically, we will focus on inflation-fighting and 
its short-term conflict with the proposals for policy favoring rapid 
economic growth. 
The context in which Goulart took office is very important in un-
derstanding his administrations’ actions. He faced rising inflation 
and a slowdown in GDP growth. These issues were accompanied by 
an aggravated status of foreign accounts with a deficit in the balance 
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of payments, as well as with difficulties attracting foreign capital and 
accumulating domestic savings. From a political standpoint, Goulart 
faced difficulty even taking office due to a radical atmosphere in 
which a portion of the military and civil opposition actually propo-
sed dismantling the constitutional rules. Despite Goulart’s attempts 
to broaden his support base by employing a moderate and conci-
liatory voice, the nation’s economic and political crises deepened. 
The increasing radicalization culminated in a military coup against 
Goulart.
The unstable political environment in which these administrations 
operated led to economic policies labeled as “hesitating”, “irratio-
nal” and “ambiguous”; the implication is that those policies were 
completely erratic and illogical. In part, these difficulties of the 
Goulart government should be blamed on the international situa-
tion at the time. The period was marked by polarization resulting 
from the Cold War; this polarization had strong repercussions in 
Latin American countries, especially after the intensification of the 
conflict between Cuba and the United States after 1961. Several 
authors, such as Skidmore (1976), Ianni (1986), Flag (2001), Fonseca 
(2003), Bastos (2011) and Loureiro (2012) explored Goulart’s fo-
reign policy, albeit using different approaches. It is noteworthy that 
his foreign policy sometimes turned away from the United States 
(especially in the last months of his presidency, when there was an 
increase in radical nationalism) and sometimes signaling for coope-
ration; the conciliatory era was mainly a result of Brazil’s need for 
loans to address growing balance of payments deficits. This positio-
ning of the Goulart government is often cited by the literature as an 
example of “populism”, which, in turn, influenced the government’s 
credibility in conducting domestic economic policy. We will demons-
trate the presence of a regular pattern in the government’s econo-
mic policy, mainly relating to the conflict between inflation versus 
growth; in doing so, we will divide the Goulart Administrations into 
two periods: the parliamentary and presidential years. We conclude 
that the government’s behavior during the two periods stem from 
the same strategy. Initially, the government was attempting to con-
vince private agents that the priority was fighting inflation; in parti-
cular, the government proposed strict policies inspired by orthodoxy 
and a need to balance the public accounts. Economic development 
was always cited as the ultimate goal. As time passed, however, the 
priority placed on stabilization gradually became less clear. The go-
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vernment had no success fighting inflation, and its credibility was 
shaken. At this point, the government began making contradictory 
decisions, both for and against stability. This oscillating and hesita-
ting policy helped to further erode the administrations’ credibility, 
and they eventually abandoned any attempt to promote stability; 
their policies almost exclusively targeted growth in a last attempt to 
broaden the government’s support base and legitimacy.
2. The Populist Pattern of Economic Policy
2.1 Economic Policy and Credibility
The empirically observed pattern in the economic policies in the two 
periods of the Goulart Administrations can be modeled to reveal 
the underlying logic. We do not attempt to test whether these were 
populist administrations. On the contrary, we take this as given, 
citing the specialized literature, especially within political science. 
Assuming this previous analysis is adequate, the proper methodo-
logical procedure approaches the question of whether there was in 
fact an economic policy pattern that we might call “populist” during 
these periods; in particular, we look for empirical evidence to help 
us understand how the populist phenomenon may have manifested 
itself in this environment.
According to Dornbusch and Edwards (1990), the populist paradigm 
in economics is characterized by four phases. During the first phase, 
production levels, real wages and the employment growth rate are 
high. An expansion in demand is counterbalanced by diminishing 
inventories and an increase in exports, which relieves the impact 
on prices. The financing of imports may occur through a reduction 
in reserves or a default on foreign payments. In the second pha-
se, bottlenecks in production start to emerge. Inventories continue 
to decrease and price realignments, exchange control, devaluation 
and/or protectionism are necessary. Inflation simultaneously rises, 
although wages remain high and the public deficit worsens. In the 
third phase, insufficient supply of goods and services, acceleration 
in inflation and exchange rate problems lead to capital flight and a 
demonetization of the economy. The public deficit becomes even 
larger and real wages fall. During this phase, policies become unsta-
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ble. In the final phase, a new administration implements orthodox 
stabilization policies.
This sequence does not seem to adequately describe economic policy 
during the Goulart Administrations. As discussed in Persson and 
Tabellini (1995), the traditional approach of framing government 
decisions as permanent has given way to approaches that describe 
economic policy as the result of a strategic interaction between the 
government and the private sector. In this sense, a game-theore-
tic approach helps frame the pattern observed in the two Goulart 
Administrations as an equilibrium of the relevant “political games.”1
Following Barro (1986), let zt  be the government’s cost function, 
which depends on current inflation πt and surprise inflation (πt - πte), 
where πte is the inflation expected by the public.
 zt (πt, πt - πte ) =  (a/2) πt2 - b( πt -   πte )                                       (1) 
The coefficients a and b are positive, which means that the costs 
increase with current inflation πt and decrease with surprise infla-
tion (πt - πte). Surprise inflation is beneficial to the government be-
cause unanticipated monetary expansions may lead to an increase in 
economic activity; this increased activity lowers the unemployment 
rate, which is consistent with the definition of populism. This result 
can be obtained if we assume the existence of a Phillips curve along 
which the government can trade off inflation and unemployment.
The government attempts to minimize the expected present value 
of the costs, which is given by:
 E[zt + zt+1/(1+r) + ...+ zT /(1+r)T-t ],    
where r > 0 is the exogenous, constant discount rate and T is the 
terminal period.
In determining the equilibrium, Barro assumes two rules for the 
government’s behavior. In the first rule, the government is commit-
ted to an inflation goal, so that πte = πt  and the level of inflation 
1 We assume that the economic policy decisions are the result of a problem of strategic ra-
tional choice in which the government and the private sector each maximize an objective 
function subject to constraints.
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that minimizes costs is πt = 0 in all periods. The government’s cost 
in each period is z(0,0)= 0. In the second situation, the government 
acts discretionarily, taking the public’s present and future inflation 
expectation as given. In this case, there will be a value for the infla-
tion rate in t that minimizes the cost, given by:
 πtm = b/a.                                                                        (2)
The public, as a rational player, also solves the government’s mini-
mization problem and chooses πte = πtm = b/a. Therefore, the Nash 
equilibrium of the model is characterized by zero surprise inflation. 
The cost to the government is: 
zt = zm = z( πt, 0) = (1/2) b2/a > 0.                     (3)
We can see that there is a higher cost to a government following the 
discretionary policy than a policy committing to an inflation target. 
In the next stage of the analysis, we model the public as uncertain 
of the type of administration it is facing. Type 1 is strong; that is, it 
is committed to the non-inflationary goal. Type 2 is weak; that is, 
it has no capacity to make such a commitment and minimizes the 
expected current value of the costs. The government knows what 
its type is; however, the public does not know what type of govern-
ment it is dealing with and must identify the type based only on 
the government’s decisions. The fact that the public does not know 
the type of government it is dealing with allows the weak govern-
ment to manipulate its reputation: it could pretend to be strong by 
choosing πt = 0. By doing so, it tries to reduce the public’s inflation 
expectation, thus minimizing its costs. The time period for which 
the administration is in office is finite, lasting from 0 to T. In the 
final period T, which is common knowledge, the weak government 
does not have any more incentive to signal that it is strong: it chooses 
πt = πm = b/a.
Following Barro, let pt be the probability that a weak government 
chooses πt = 0, under the condition that the choice in the previous 
periods has been non-inflationary. Let αt be the public’s subjective 
probability in period t that the government is of the strong type, 
where α0 is common knowledge. Let ptp be the perception the public 
holds with regard to the value of pt. 
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If the result in period t is πt = 0, there are two possibilities: either the 
government is of the strong type (with probability αt), or it is of the 
weak type (with probability 1 - αt ) and is pretending (with probability 
pt ). The result πt = πtm will arise if the government is of the weak type 
(probability 1 - αt) and is not pretending to be strong (probability 1 - 
pt). Thus, the expected inflation in period t is given by:
πte = πtm (1 - αt) (1 - ptp),                      (4)
which is the best forecast for πt, given αt and ptp. If the public ob-
serves πt = 0, it updates its beliefs regarding the government’s repu-
tation in the next period according to Bayes’ rule:
αt+1  = Prob (type 1 | πt, πt-1, ... = 0)
        αt+1 = [Prob (type 1 | πt-1, ... = 0). 
Prob (πt = 0 | type1)] / Prob (πt = 0 | πt-1, ... = 0)
        αt+1 = αt / [ αt + (1 - αt) ptp ].                                       (5)
This expression indicates that if the public observes πt = 0, the go-
vernment’s reputation improves in the next period.
Under these conditions, Barro identifies two equilibrium intervals. 
In the first interval, (0, τ - 1), the weak government mimics the 
strong government by choosing πt = 0 in an attempt to reduce the 
public’s expectation of inflation. The government then profits from 
surprise inflation in the future. In this interval, there is no infor-
mation gathering about the type of government because the public 
knows that both types can choose πt = 0 and αt remains constant. 
In the second interval, (τ, T - 1), the weak government randomizes, 
choosing πt = 0 with probability pt and πt = b/a  with probability 
1 - pt. In this interval, αt is updated according to Bayes’ rule. If the 
government chooses πt = 0, αt+1 is increasing and pt is decreasing. The 
intuition behind this result is that, as the administration approaches 
its end, the gain obtained by low inflation offsets the advantage of 
today’s inflation and makes the government indifferent between in-
flation and no inflation. 
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The condition that supports policy randomization is formulated by 
Barro as follows:
z(0, - πte) - z (πtm, πtm - πte ) = [1/(1+r)].[zm - z (πt+1m, πt+1m - πt+1e)].   (6)
On the left side of the equation, we have the government’s tempta-
tion to inflate today, choosing πt = πtm instead of πt = 0. On the right 
side, we see what Barro referred to as “enforcement power”, which 
represents the gain from postponing high inflation.
Combining the functional form (1) of the government’s cost func-
tion with Expression (6), the trajectory of expected inflation in the 
interval (τ + 1, T), we obtain:
 πte = [(1 - r) / 2].( b/a )                                                  (7)
Combining this result with (4), we obtain:
(1 - αt)(1 - pt) = (1 - r)/2                     (8)
In (8), we see that an increase in αt is accompanied by a fall in pt; 
that is, the better the reputation acquired by a weak government, 
the lower the probability that it chooses πt = 0. The equilibrium 
trajectory of αt and pt is obtained by combining (8) and (5):
 αt = [(1 + r) / 2]T+1-t                 (9)
pt = {[(1 + r) / 2] - [(1 + r) / 2]T+1-t} / {1 - [(1 + r) / 2]T+1-t}          (10)
for τ +1 ≤ t ≤ T. The trajectories of the equilibrium show that αt in-
creases over time, while pt diminishes. The value of T- τ, the length 
of the interval in which randomization occurs, is given by:
T - τ = int{ log(α0) / log[( 1 + r )/2]}                                         (11)
The main results of the model can be summarized by the analysis 
of the equilibrium trajectories of αt and pt. In the first interval, (0, τ 
-1), the probability that the weak government chooses not to inflate 
is 100% (pt = 1), the subjective probability that the public assigns to 
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the possibility of dealing with a strong government is constant (αt = 
α0) and the expected inflation is low (πte = πt = 0). The range of this 
interval depends on the final period (T), the initial public subjective 
probability (α0) and the time discount rate (r), all of which are of 
common knowledge. In period τ, there is a slight decline in pt, but αt 
remains constant. From τ+1 forward, pt decreases and αt increases. 
Along the entire trajectory, although the public observes low infla-
tion, the expected inflation πte is constant. This occurs even though 
the low inflation improves the government’s reputation (αt+1 > αt) 
because the fall in pt offsets the effect on the public’s expectation 
of inflation; this tension makes any attempt to reduce inflationary 
expectations through the reputation mechanism futile. At time T, 
the value of pt is zero because the government has no more incentive 
to pretend to be strong. We observe that the maintenance of a low 
level of inflation by a strong government in the face of a constant 
πte will result in economic recession. As we will outline in the next 
section, Barro’s model provides a general description of the economic 
policy during the Goulart Administrations.
2.2.   Measuring Credibility
Despite being one of the main lines of recent research in macroe-
conomic theory, empirical knowledge about credibility is still quite 
limited. Blackburn and Christensen (1989, p.36) show some of the 
problems that occur regarding the notion of credibility. First, they 
mention the necessity of using proxy variables to measure credibi-
lity once we are dealing with expectations, which is an intangible 
concept by nature. By adopting such an approach, the reliability of 
results is dependent on the choice of the proxy variable. Another 
problem mentioned by the authors is inspired by the well-known 
Lucas Critique (1976) regarding the assumption of stability of para-
meters in econometric models; specifically, structural changes may 
result from modifications in economic policy. As credibility changes 
over time, it becomes difficult to obtain a dataset that properly des-
cribes credibility. Finally, the authors cite the analytical simplicity 
of existing credibility models as another obstacle to empirical kno-
wledge. They argue that the theoretical constructs are excessively 
stylized and centered on a few economic variables that are often 
inadequate for testing.
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These difficulties in dealing with credibility are manifest in the 
existing empirical studies. Agénor and Taylor (1993), before pre-
senting an approach to measure the credibility of economic policy 
and its effects, summarize the commonly used procedures. Most 
of the studies adopt the prediction and error method (for example, 
Christensen, 1987a; Kremers, 1990) that consists of initially esti-
mating an inflation model (a Phillips curve, for example) up to one 
period before the implementation of the stabilization measures and 
applying these estimates to predict the inflation of the post-program 
period. If the predicted inflation is higher than the actual inflation, 
the errors in the predictions are seen as evidence that there was a 
gain in credibility. Blackburn and Christensen (1989) describe two 
limitations of this procedure. First, the expectations of inflation take 
some time to adjust to the announcement of regime change, which 
may render the data used in this type of estimate unable to identify 
them. Second, the model may simply be misspecified. The errors 
might reflect any omitted variables; assuming that they necessarily 
represent credibility is bold.
An alternative to bypass this problem is to explicitly include a proxy 
variable for credibility in the model (see, for example, Christensen, 
1987b; Croushore and Koot, 1991). Agénor and Taylor (1993), in 
highlighting the critique by Blackburn and Christensen (1989) of 
this procedure, remind us that the definition of the proxy variable is 
somewhat arbitrary and does not guarantee that the model captures 
the effects associated with changes in credibility. In spite of these 
concerns, they also propose the use of a proxy variable to measure 
expectations, as they consider it less vulnerable to the limitations 
associated with the other procedures. Given that the difference be-
tween the official and the black market exchange rate is very sensi-
tive to the expectation of the agents in relation to the governmental 
policies, the authors consider using it to construct a proxy for credi-
bility. The process decomposes the difference into two components: 
one reflects the “foundations” of the economy, and the other is the 
basis of the credibility measure. Therefore, variation in the diffe-
rence would be the result of changes in the “foundations” and in the 
credibility of the economic policies. The empirical implementation is 
performed in two steps. First, an autoregressive system is estimated; 
specifically, the difference is regressed on a predetermined vector of 
variables that represent the “foundations.” The complement of the 
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residual of this regression is defined as the credibility variable.2 In 
the second step, using the Kalman filter, inflation is estimated as an 
autoregressive process with varying parameters.3 The coefficient of 
the autoregressive component varies in accordance with the credibi-
lity. If the policy is more trustworthy, the inertial effect on inflation 
will be lower. The authors used this technique to assess the Cruzado 
Plan (implemented in Brazil in 1986) and obtained results that can 
be considered consistent with the historical interpretation of events 
during the relevant period. The main limitation of this type of pro-
cedure is that it demands the use of a time-series sample that is 
long relative to the period being analyzed to avoid the imposition of 
numerous restrictions on the credibility variable.
The application of the regression technique with varying parameters 
to assess credibility fits the variation over time on the expectations 
of the economic agents. Following this line of thought, Mankiw et 
al. (1987) assessed the effect of the creation of the Federal Reserve 
System in 1914 on expectations. The study investigated whether 
there was a change in the perception of the agents about the envi-
ronment in which they operated once the system started to func-
tion. By examining the relationships between short- and long-term 
interest rates, under the assumption that the long-term rate incor-
porates the expectation of the future short-term rate, Mankiw et 
al. tried to identify changes in the stochastic process that generates 
the short-term rate, which would alter these relationships. A mo-
del with varying parameters was used to determine the most likely 
date of the change. The authors believe that the results imply that 
there was an adjustment of expectations under the new economic 
policy regime defined by the creation of the Federal Reserve System. 
Although this technique is stronger than those previously proposed, 
it still uses a proxy variable to represent credibility that is subject to 
2 This first step is expressed as the system:
 γ(L)ρt = δ(L)zt + ut,
 δ(L) = δ1L + δ2L2 + ...δnLn,
 γ(L) = 1 + γ1L + γ2L2 +...γnLn,
where γi are scale coefficients, δi is a vector of coefficients, L is the gap operator, ρt is the agio, 
zt is the vector of the variables that represent the “foundations” and ut is the residual of the 
process. The credibility variable is defined as ct = -ut.
3 The estimate using the Kalman filter is described by the model:
 πt = αtπt-1 + εt,
 αt = αt-1 + γct + ηt,
where πt is the rate of inflation in period t and the residuals  εt and ηt are not autocorrelated, 
mean zero, of constant variance and are not correlated with one another.
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the limitations mentioned above. An additional difficulty associated 
with this type of procedure was raised by Agénor and Taylor (1993, 
p.330): approaches that consider a single point of change, as is true 
in Mankiw et al., are useful for examining changes in trustworthy 
and permanent regimes within the period under consideration; ho-
wever, they are less valuable when credibility is short-lived and may 
have more than one inflection point.
Thus far, the procedures mentioned all use sampling theory, as 
found in classical statistics. Another line of procedures attempts to 
be more loyal to the true spirit of the credibility models by adop-
ting an explicitly Bayesian approach to estimate the expectations 
of the economic agents regarding the government’s commitment to 
stability. As Baxter (1985, p.348) states, “This problem has a na-
tural Bayesian interpretation as it involves the principle of ‘inverse 
probability’, where the data are taken as given and the problem is to 
try to infer what random process generated them.”
The method developed by Baxter (1985) defines credibility as the 
subjective probability which the agents assign to the government’s 
commitment to the measures of stability, making it a function of the 
adopted economic policies’ parameters. To be credible, a program 
must feasibly satisfy two conditions that highlight the interaction 
between the fiscal and monetary sides of the economy: first, the rate 
of expansion of the money supply must be reduced as announced; 
second, deficit financing must not imply an explosive trajectory of 
the public debt levels. It is assumed in the model that the set of all 
possible governmental policies can be divided into two subsets: one 
containing the policies that favor stability and the other containing 
policies that do not favor stability. It is up to the economic agents to 
assign a certain probability as to whether the regime’s economic po-
licy belongs to the set that favors stability. Based on that probability, 
they can estimate the parameters of the rules of the governmental 
policy and then predict the future values of the variables. The more 
observations that are aggregated into the initial stock of information, 
the more precisely the agents will know the real parameters. In this 
process of learning by experience, the calculation of the probability 
that the rules of the governmental policy will belong to the set of 
measures that lead to stability is made using Bayes’ rule, and it is 
updated with every available new piece of information.
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The measure of credibility proposed by Baxter-adopting Bayes’ rule 
as a way to update the confidence of the economic agents on the 
commitment of the government to stabilization - is closer to the con-
cept of credibility observed in the models described in the previous 
section. Therefore, it will be used to estimate the credibility of the 
economic policy during the Goulart Administrations.
3. The Goulart Administrations
After the Vargas suicide in August 1954, the Café Filho (08/1954 
to 11/1955) and the Juscelino Kubitschek (01/1956 to 01/1961) 
Administrations followed. The latter recorded high growth rates and 
gave the country an integrated and diversified industrial structure 
through the Plano de Metas (Plan of Goals), but it also left to its 
successor, the Jânio Quadros Administration (01/1961 to 08/1961) 
serious domestic and foreign imbalance. Eight months after taking 
office, Quadros resigned from the presidency and put the country in 
one of the most serious institutional crises in its history. The Armed 
Forces resisted the idea of Vice President João Goulart taking office. 
Congress did not accept the military’s veto. The conflict was bypas-
sed with the adoption of the parliamentary system on September 
2, 1961. Goulart was supposed to remain in office until January 31, 
1966; at some point before this date, there would be a referendum 
on whether to confirm the new regime. 
In this volatile political environment, João Goulart took office as 
president on September 7, 1961. The following day, Tancredo Neves, 
a member of the PSD (Social Democratic Party), the majority party 
in Congress, was nominated to the position of prime minister. By 
the end of 1962, Congress set January 6, 1963, as the date for the 
referendum that would define the political regime to be adopted. 
The public voted by a wide margin in favor of a return to the presi-
dential system.
The situation that Goulart inherited was not much different from 
that inherited by President Vargas ten years earlier. Foreign policy 
was the only area in which the new administration did not have im-
mediate problems to solve, thanks to the agreements made by the 
Quadros Administration. Inflation, as calculated by the IGP-DI, had 
reached 30.5% in 1960 and was again the main problem to be solved. 
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Once more, economic policy was divided between trying to avoid a 
rise in inflation and maintaining economic growth. The result was a 
reduction in the rate of economic growth, an acceleration in inflation 
and a deterioration in the balance of payments, especially between 
1961 and 1963.
Overall, the interpretations for the loss of dynamism in the economy 
either highlight the structural character of the crisis (Furtado, 1968; 
Tavares and Serra, 1972; Ianni, 1986) in a longer-term view or men-
tion the short-term aspects (Leff, 1977; Wells, 1977), often linking 
them to the scenario marked by the existing political instability. In 
general terms, the economic policies are described as indefinite or 
incoherent. Criticizing Economic Commission for Latin America’s 
(ECLA) structuralism, Simonsen (1969, p. 67-68) writes, “Another 
example, another specific to Brazil, concerns the decline in the 
growth rate of the real output between 1962 and 1967. In the view 
of orthodoxy, this was a reflection of the disequilibrium inherited 
from the 1950’s, of the irrationality of the economic policy between 
August 1961 and March 1964, and of the further efforts for moneta-
ry stabilization.” In the view of Baer (1996, p. 87), “the tumultuous 
years that followed the resignation in the end of August 1961, until 
the overthrow of the next government in April 1964 were desti-
tute of any consistent path in economic policy.” In their analysis 
of populism in Brazil, Castro and Ronci (1991, p.160-161) remark, 
“The features of Goulart’s populism fit nicely into the description 
of a conventional mishandling of economic tools.” However, a more 
detailed analysis of the parliamentary and presidential systems du-
ring Goulart’s term will let us detect a pattern of rationality in the 
economic policy that is consistent with Barro’s model.
3.1  The Parliamentary Period
When the first parliamentary Cabinet took office in September 
1961, it was faced with a difficult economic situation that was made 
even worse by the environment of political instability that followed 
Quadros’ resignation. The effort to build a reputation of strong go-
vernment began with the nomination of a Cabinet in favor of auste-
rity. In the search for a consensus administration, each of the main 
parties was chosen to be part of the Cabinet in a reasonably balanced 
share of the ministries. As expected, a conservative minister was 
Credibility and Populism                                                                                                     525
Est. Econ., São Paulo, vol. 42, n.3, p. 511-544, jul.-set. 2012
place in charge of the economy. The Finance Ministry was headed 
by the orthodox banker Walter Moreira Salles, who was responsible 
for the successful Brazilian foreign debt negotiation in the United 
States during the Quadros Administration. Soon after taking office, 
he emphasized in his speeches the austerity of the economic po-
licy to be undertaken, which would be “carried out through shared 
decisions of Parliament” (Jornal do Comércio, September 11, 1961, 
p. 6). He was attempting to distance himself from the presidential 
figure, although the power of the president was not just symbolic 
in the Brazilian system; the president was responsible for choosing 
the prime minister to be submitted for the parliament’s approval. 
It is particularly illuminating to mention the case of the Ministry 
of Mines & Energy. For political reasons, its leadership was given 
to Gabriel Passos, a member of the nationalistic wing of the UDN 
(National Democratic Union). However, to assuage any concerns 
from the sector’s foreign investors, the new minister soon made 
assuring declarations through the press; he stated the importance 
of foreign capital and the role it played in the country’s growth. 
Another ministry worth highlighting is the Ministry of Labor & 
Social Security: its leadership was not given to the PTB (Brazilian 
Labor Party). The PTB was a member and long-time leader of the 
governing alliance, and this decision clearly demonstrated that the 
administration wanted to avoid any link with the practices of the 
old labor party.
Due to the unclear division of power between the president and the 
prime minister, the government’s credibility was largely defined by 
Goulart’s image, both inside and outside the country. Therefore, his 
early presidential speeches had a moderate tone, undertaking res-
ponsibility for democracy, highlighting its opposition to communism, 
and giving political support to the strictest anti-inflation measures 
proposed by the Cabinet. 
The apparent success of Goulart’s trip to the United States in April 
1962, manifested in the ratification of the agreements made by the 
Quadros Administration (although subject to the execution of the 
stabilization program), served to consolidate his political position 
domestically, especially within the middle class and the military. 
However, to stay in power, the administration had to be trusted by 
the economic agents with respect to its capacity to lead the country 
toward economic stability. The failure of the first attempt at stabi-
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lization by the first parliamentary Cabinet, consolidated in the so-
-called “Emergency Action” in September 1961, shook the public’s 
trust in the administration. The measures that were taken did not 
have the desired effect, and the final months of the year were cha-
racterized by a lack of fiscal and monetary control. The truth is that 
the administration did not immediately possess the tools to address 
the problems inherited from the previous government; hence, the 
administration made the decision to concentrate efforts for stabiliza-
tion on the following year. In January 1962, Moreira Salles, stressed 
that he would back down and made a plea for the “noble sacrifice” 
the situation demanded, even as he faced pressures from the busi-
ness community opposing a possible tax increase and restrictions 
imposed by the stabilization program (Jornal do Comércio, January 
1st, 1962, p.8).
The new stabilization program, which was introduced in March 
1962, announced goals for a limit on expenditures and on the ex-
pansion of money and credit, aiming to reach the economic stability 
in that year. On the expenditures side, three measures were propo-
sed: a new plan for a limit on expenditures to be sent to Congress 
for approval, which would save approximately Cr$60 billion; a plan 
for a budget that outlined payments for supplies and services for the 
period from January-May 1963, in the amount of Cr$81 billion; and 
the transfer of Cr$38 billion in expenditure authorizations to future 
fiscal years, with no set date of liquidation. Through these measures, 
the cash deficit would have been reduced to Cr$150 billion. In an 
effort to establish non-inflationary sources for financing the deficit, 
which was constrained by the constitutional limitation with respect 
to new tax changes taking effect in the same fiscal year, the govern-
ment borrowed two sums of funds to cover the difference. One was 
a compulsory fund of Cr$20 billion, in the form of an additional 
tax on the income of companies and individuals, and a voluntary 
fund, estimated at Cr$100 billion in Treasury Bills or Obligations 
with a safety clause against monetary devaluation. The remaining 
deficit, Cr$30 billion, was meant to be financed by the Banco do 
Brasil. Beyond these measures, an administrative tax reform was 
proposed that was aimed at guiding the economy to equilibrium in 
the following years. The program stated that the measures to control 
the public deficit should be complemented by restrictions on credit 
expansion on the part of the monetary authorities. The loans from 
the Banco do Brasil to the private sector could not grow more than 
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Cr$35 billion over the year (nominal increase of roughly 12.7%), 
and the loans made via rediscount were limited to Cr$15 billion. In 
April, the first month of the program’s execution, these goals were 
met. The public deficit and credit to the private sector stayed within 
the established limits; however, both figures came dangerously close 
to the exceeding the set goals. 
Although the conditions underlying the implementation of the par-
liamentary regime resulted from a commitment engendered by that 
traditionally in power, they led to constant political instability du-
ring the parliamentary period. The regime was implemented through 
a constitutional amendment “worked out in a few hours under the 
emotional influence of exceptional events” (Brochado da Rocha, 
apud Abreu, 1989, p.200) and there was constant pressure—first 
covert, then overt4—from President João Goulart to regain full po-
wers traditionally ascribed to his office. Goulart’s moves to regain 
power and his adversaries’ responses to prevent him from succeeding 
only further increased the instability inherent in performing the 
parliamentary role. This instability contributed to a clear reduction 
in the decision making horizon of the economic policymakers.
An election for the entirety of the House of Representatives, one-
-third of the Senate and the governors of half of the states was 
scheduled for October 7th. The proximity of this election contri-
buted to further confusion in the political environment, increased 
polarization around the stabilization program and hampered the 
approval of the necessary but unpopular measures. The members 
of Congress, including Cabinet members, had no interest in associa-
ting their names with the approval of laws that could damage their 
electoral prospects. This is typically a situation in which the future 
is strongly discounted, as the option for stability might be had at a 
cost of at least four years of political ostracism. By mid-May, the 
legislature had approved only the increase in the percentage of the 
banks’ compulsory deposits. The bills authorizing the compulsory 
and voluntary loans and the salary increase for federal employees 
went back to the House, after being amended in the Senate.5 The 
tax reform bill, sent to Congress in November of 1961, would not 
4 “For fourteen months, from September 1961 to January 1963, Jango carefully manipulated 
in order to regain presidential powers.” (Skidmore, 1976, p.264)
5 These bills were eventually approved by the House of Representatives in June. In the case 
of the federal employees’ salary raise, the amount was equivalent to an increase of approxi-
mately Cr$94.5 billion, well above the Cr$82 billion anticipated in the stabilization program.
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be analyzed quickly. To make things worse, the degree of political 
polarization was exacerbated due to arguments about base reforms 
and the remittance of profits, issues that represented the main con-
flicting political projects at the time. 
The apparent randomization of the economic policy decisions, cau-
sed by the government’s shortened decision making horizon, the 
increase in its discount rate over time and the government’s rising 
credibility in its first months (with an associated reduction in the 
likelihood that the government would continue looking strong), was 
very clear by May and can be perceived in the confrontation betwe-
en the monetary and fiscal policies. From this month forward, the 
government deficit quickly increased, surpassing the goals establi-
shed by the program. In a contradictory decision, the administra-
tion simultaneously adopted restrained credit measures, raising the 
compulsory deposit through SUMOC’s Instruction 225 on May 18, 
1962. Another example that reveals the ambiguous posture of the 
government after May can be observed in Goulart’s own behavior. 
As the popular discontent with regard to the effects of the stabili-
zation program grew, Goulart vacated the position he had taken at 
the beginning of his term: he abandoned the emphasis on stability to 
focus on advocacy for base reforms. This behavior progressed steadi-
ly, as seen in two speeches. On May 1, still using moderate language, 
Goulart advocated the need for constitutional changes that would 
permit the expropriation of land for land reform purposes, payable 
in bonds and not in cash. In an address to longshoremen on May 14, 
Goulart was much more incisive, stressing his links with Vargas’ 
trabalhismo and preaching the necessity of reforms to assure the 
economic emancipation of the country, with a particular emphasis on 
land reform. Additionally, the president denied any responsibility for 
the economic situation of the country, instead blaming the Cabinet 
for the difficulties the population was experiencing.
The effect of the administration’s change of attitude toward stability 
measures can be observed in the figures of the main political varia-
bles. In May, the government exceeded the limit projected for the 
public deficit and, consequently, the limit of credit from the Banco 
do Brasil to the Treasury. In that month, the credit to the private 
sector still remained within the limits that were set in the program. 
Nevertheless, as noted by Abreu (1989, p.203), “the lack of control 
over the economy becomes evident as of May with the significant 
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increase in the government’s cash deficit produced by the raise in 
public expenditure and the raise in the expansion rate of the money 
supply.” The month of June, the last of the Neves Cabinet, marked 
the full renunciation of the stabilization policy. In that month, the 
public deficit rose to a level more than double that which had been 
set as the annual goal and the limit of the nominal credit from the 
Banco do Brasil to the private sector was exceeded. This series of 
events destroyed what remained of the government’s credibility. 
At this stage, the lack of credibility made any new attempt for sta-
bilization impossible. The new Cabinet, led by Brochado da Rocha, 
made some efforts, but the odds of success were minimal. The fis-
cal, monetary and credit limits were exceeded. Furthermore, the 
referendum to decide the political system hampered any potential 
stabilization endeavors by rendering the government temporary. 
Moreira Salles stepped aside in September of 1962; he was exhaus-
ted by the conflicts between the measures he tried to implement 
and the speeches of the president, other administration officials 
and their support base in Congress. These speeches had a strongly 
nationalistic tone, supporting the expropriation of the Telephone 
Company of Rio Grande do Sul (a subsidiary of an American com-
pany) and a bill limiting the remittance of profits abroad, which was 
approved by the Senate in early June shortly before the approval of 
the National Council for Land Reform. 
The year of 1962 ended with a high GDP growth rate (6.6%)—al-
though inferior to that of 1961 (8.1%)—an inflation rate of 51.6% 
and a negative trade balance of 89 million dollars; the change in the 
trade balance was mainly a result of a fall in exports (from US$ 
1,405 million to US$ 1,215 million), as imports increased only sli-
ghtly (from US$ 1,292 million to US$ 1,304 million). By the end of 
the year, Goulart blamed the IMF for these difficulties; in particu-
lar, he cited the conditions the IMF imposed on the Latin American 
economies (Jornal do Comércio, December 6, 1962, p.6). 
3.2    The Presidential Period
After regaining full powers in January 1963, Goulart faced the diffi-
cult challenge of regaining the trust of the economic agents in terms 
of his capacity (and will) to solve the serious problems the country 
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was facing; worse, these problems were partly deepened by his own 
actions during the parliamentary period. Once more, in view of the 
fragile structure of the country’s economic institutions, the attempt 
toward stabilization was laid on a delicate framework: the nomina-
tions of the ministers. Goulart tried to choose a ministry made of 
eminent personalities, and moderation was a key requirement. San 
Tiago Dantas was appointed Finance Minister. Although a member 
of the left wing of PTB, the new minister was known for his advo-
cacy of orthodox ideas in fighting inflation. In the economic arena, 
Celso Furtado was a minister without a ministry; he was not linked 
to any political party and was responsible for the economic planning 
and for managing SUDENE. The hard-line leftists were represented 
by the Minister of Labor, Almino Afonso, and by the ultranationalist 
João Mangabeira, who was in charge of the Ministry of Interior & 
Justice. These appointments were an indication that Goulart was not 
willing to separate himself completely from his ties with the unions. 
The Ministry of Defense continued in the hands of General Amauri 
Kruel, a moderate. 
The first measures of this new phase of the Goulart Administration 
were codified in the Triennial Plan. The plan tried to reissue the old 
Campos Salles - Rodrigues Alves “formula”, emphasizing the com-
mitment to the economic development that would have short-run 
stability as a prerequisite; without stability, the growth goals them-
selves would be jeopardized. Therefore, the Triennial Plan intended 
to execute typical restraining policies from conventional stabilization 
programs such as reduction of the public deficit, control of money 
issuance and restraints on credit to the private sector. Additionally, 
it proposed making the exchange rates uniform and fixing them 
within a realistic range. To demonstrate the seriousness of its in-
tentions, the administration set fiscal and monetary goals that were 
to be fulfilled throughout the year. Once again, the behavior from 
the parliamentary period was repeated: strong measures to fight 
inflation were announced as a way for the government to build its 
reputation as strong on inflation. 
The outcome was reasonably positive in the first months. The cur-
rency devaluation in April nearly drove the official exchange rate to 
the parallel market rate, which showed a change in the level of pu-
blic trust in the government. The goal for the public deficit was not 
fulfilled in the first quarter because the norms of financial execution 
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were established only in March; however, in the second quarter, the 
administration did not violate the limit. Although the government 
did not achieve the fixed nominal goals of the credit policy, the po-
licy was restrictive in real terms in the first two quarters: in the first 
quarter, real credit shrank almost 17%. In the second quarter, the 
reduction was approximately 4%. The rise in prices, after the cor-
rective inflation of the first months, slowed in April, which signaled 
the possibility of success for the stabilization program. 
Despite the easy victory in the referendum, the political situation in 
the beginning of Goulart’s presidential administration was not calm. 
Radicalization of the public continued and the government’s stabi-
lity depended on Goulart’s capacity to calm the conflicting groups. 
Skidmore (1976) highlights the two disputing sides: the traditional 
anti-Vargas faction led by Carlos Lacerda and the radical left led 
by Leonel Brizola. According to Skidmore, the impossibility of a 
commitment policy emerged most clearly in the controversies over 
foreign capital and land reform. 
Thanks in part to both groups, the threat of a coup loomed during 
the whole term and was finally realized in March 1964. The hard-li-
ne right-wingers had conspired against Goulart even before Quadros’ 
resignation; there had been resistance since his time as a minister 
under Vargas. Now better organized, they were able to garner the 
decisive support of the Social Studies and Research Institute (IPES), 
an organization founded in November 1961 by businessmen from Rio 
de Janeiro and São Paulo who opposed Goulart’s guidelines. Such 
strong support strengthened the conspiracy movement which already 
admitted to the “use of more direct methods” to resist the govern-
ment. The radical leftists likewise left open the possibility of “direct 
methods to fight the ‘coup advocates’, ‘betrayers’ and ‘reactionaries’” 
(Skidmore, 1976, p.275-276, marks by the author). The imminent 
possibility of a coup contributed to the reduction of the temporal 
horizon of the government’s decision making and to increase its dis-
count rate. A move by Goulart in either direction could have meant 
the end of the government by means of a coup on the part of the 
neglected group. Such a move occurred by the end of 1963 when 
Goulart sided with the radical left in an effort to stay in power; this 
marked a shift in his handling of economic policy. 
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The economic difficulties associated with the costs of the stabiliza-
tion program combined with the progressive deterioration of poli-
tical conditions to deepen the ongoing political radicalization. The 
measures of fiscal and monetary discipline, which were necessary 
for the stabilization effort, were interpreted by the nationalists as 
a requirement imposed by the developed countries to suit their in-
terests at the expense of the Brazilian population. The corrective 
inflation that followed the readjustments of the exchange rate and 
public utility prices and the government’s tight credit policy made 
the government even more vulnerable to criticism by the opposition. 
At this moment, one could say that the cost of adjustment neared 
to the cost of inflation and the administration became indifferent 
between the alternatives.
The government’s change in attitude toward stability that marked 
the beginning of the stage of economic policy randomization first 
surfaced during the civil servant salary readjustment in May. In 
agreeing to a readjustment of 70% one week after the IMF visi-
ted the country, the administration knew it was jeopardizing the 
central commitment of the stabilization program. Although the 
May and June financial reprogramming kept the deficit at approxi-
mately the same level that was forecast in the initial program, the 
administration’s move cast doubt on its capacity to support fiscal 
discipline. From the perspective of monetary policy, tight credit 
was still imposed by SUMOC’s Instructions 234 and 235.6 Once 
more, we observe the lack of harmony between the government’s 
fiscal and monetary policies. The main economic variables in the 
third quarter confirm the contradictory nature of the economic po-
licy executed. The goal for the public deficit was surpassed by over 
100%; in contrast, the credit to the private sector, while not respec-
ting the nominal limits anymore, remained stagnant in real terms. 
The ambiguity of the economic policy is stressed by Lessa (1982, 
p.134): “However, although in the second half of 1963 the fiscal, 
exchange and monetary policies did not comply with the Triennial 
Plan, exceeding their projections, there were still attempts of conjoi-
ned formulation of the short-run policies, which were unfortunately 
6 Through Instruction 234, enacted February 14, quarterly limits of expansion were fixed for 
the Department of General Credit and the Department of Agricultural & Industrial Credit. 
Instruction 235, enacted March 7, set the limits of the credit operations according to the 
programming of the Triennial Plan and measures of selective control of investments, with 
credit priority bands. In addition, it increased the percentage of the compulsory deposits 
from 20 to 28% for in-cash deposits, and from 7 to 14% for installment deposits.
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not very successful”. The problem is that the nonfulfillment of the 
goals eroded the government’s credibility, pushing the economy to 
the discretionary equilibrium. 
One of the last attempts to a short-run stabilization was SUMOC’s 
Instruction 255, by which the banks that surpassed the government’s 
authorized credit limits would be required to buy Treasury bonds, 
without interest, with a discharge term of 180 days. This measure 
was proposed by Carvalho Pinto, the second Finance Minister un-
der Goulart. By choosing a conservative politician who had good 
relations in the business environment in São Paulo, Goulart tried 
to foster an image of moderation, meaning he would not abandon 
his pursuit of credibility. However, as Pinto took office, he made 
it clear that his policies would alter the government priority re-
garding stabilization; it should be pursued, but it would have to be 
compatible with the search for short-run growth. The most popular 
newsmagazine of the time, O Cruzeiro, reported this as a positive 
fact: “Mr. Carvalho Pinto intends to discipline the finances, but will 
soften the controls fixed by his antecessor promoting some items 
of the development program. His name commands confidence to 
the ruling classes and calms São Paulo, so restless of late as a result 
of the direction of the government” (July 13, 1963). By doing so, 
the minister looked for more social support, but especially tried 
to synchronize his speech with the president’s; in a previous issue, 
O Cruzeiro reported that when Goulart chose his Cabinet, he “Had 
serious thoughts about the possibility of making public construc-
tions and opening new job opportunities in the many areas of the 
country.” Additionally, “despite the danger” of a rise in inflation, the 
option “offered the best advantages from the political point of view” 
(July 6, 1963). On the same day as the enactment of Instruction 
255, populism ceased to be a vague voice looking for legitimacy; re-
percussions abroad were so high that Roberto Campos, the Brazilian 
ambassador to the United States, resigned from his post because 
he considered “the possibilities of credit to Brazil totally lost, after 
the cabinet changes made to alter the financial recovery policy.” In 
August, Businessweek magazine reported that Goulart had abando-
ned the inflation-fighting policy altogether.
The revocation of SUMOC’s Instruction 255 after only two mon-
ths—when the economy was already under the third Finance 
Minister, Nei Galvão—marks the passing of the handling of the 
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economic policy to the discretionary equilibrium phase, when the 
administration no longer had public credibility. In Skidmore’s words 
(1976, p.326): “the death-knell was tolled when Carvalho Pinto left 
the Finance Ministry by the end of December. One of the first ac-
tions of his successor was to agree with the revocation of SUMOC’s 
Instruction 255, thus putting down the last resource to finance the 
dying Triennial Plan.” By December, no more references were made 
to the goals set in the early months. By the end of 1963, the de-
ficit was 50% above the forecast and the tightening of credit was 
reversed.
4. Credibility in the Goulart Administrations
To support the hypothesis that the credibility played a fundamental 
role in the way economic policy was conducted during the Goulart 
Administrations, we estimate the credibility of these policies using 
a Bayesian approach. Following Baxter (1985), in the empirical im-
plementation of this credibility model, it is assumed that the govern-
mental policies can be described using a linear multiple regression 
model:
y = X’θ + u,                      (12)
where y is the policy’s variable, X is a vector of state variables, θ is 
a vector of regression coefficients and u is the error term, assumed 
to be i.i.d. (independently and identically distributed) and normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. When a new economic 
policy regime is proclaimed at t = 0 to be enacted as of t = 1, the 
agents possess prior beliefs about the real future value of θ and σ; 
these beliefs are summarized by a prior probability density function 
f(θ). Through Bayes’ rule, this prior function is combined with the 
sample information obtained after the proclamation of the measures, 
represented by a likelihood function, f(yt|θ). This combination yields 
the posterior probability density function f(θ|yt). Credibility then 
is defined as the posterior probability assigned by the agents to the 
event that the economic policy belongs to the set of measures that 
lead to stability. At time t, it will be:
Ct = ∫ θ∈ R f( θ|yt ) dθ,                                                      (13)
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where f(θ|yt) is the marginal posterior probability density function 
for θ, given the vector of observations of the variable for policy yt, 
and R is the set of measures that favor stability.
According to Baxter (1985), there are two conditions that must be 
satisfied for a stability program to be trustworthy: the rate of expan-
sion of the money supply should adhere to what was announced and 
deficit financing should occur under conditions that do not imply an 
explosive trajectory of the public debt level. These conditions can 
be expressed by two rules under the assumption of a fixed exchange 
rate. The monetary policy rule is given by:
DCt = ( 1 + θ + εt ) DCt-1,                              (14)
where DCt  is the level of domestic credit, θ is the target for the cre-
dit growth rate and ε is the error, with mean zero and σε2  variance. 
Assuming the equality between the domestic inflation rate π, and 
the foreign inflation rate π*, the monetary authority must keep θ ≤ 
π* to prevent an excessive money supply. This guideline ensures that 
the exchange rate remains at the established level and that inflation 
is reduced. The fiscal policy rule is given by:
Dt = α0 + α1Bt-1 + ut,                                                                   (15)
where Dt is the real value of deficit minus the debt service at time 
t, Bt-1 is the real value of the governmental debt stock in period t-1, 
and ut is the error with mean zero and σu2 variance. The budget 
constraint of the government is given by:
Dt = Bt – (1 + r) Bt-1 + (DCt – DCt-1)/pt,                                     (16)
where r is the real interest rate which is assumed to be constant, and 
pt is the level of prices in t.
Combining Equations (14) and (15), we obtain:
Bt = α0 + γ Bt-1 - (DCt – DCt-1)/pt + ut,                                        (17)
where γ = (1 + r + α1). The necessary condition such that the 
governmental debt does not have an explosive trajectory is γ < 1 
because, in that case, α1 < -r. From Equation (15), this condition 
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ensures that at each period the government reduces part of the total 
of its debt.
According to Rocha (1997), under a flexible exchange rate regime, 
the change in domestic credit is the change in the money supply. 
Therefore, the monetary policy rule is given by:
MBt = ( 1 + θ + εt ) MBt-1,                                                         (18)
where MBt is the monetary base in t, θ is the rate of growth of the 
monetary base and ε  is the error, with mean zero and σε2 variance. 
The monetary restraint requires that θ ≤ 0, which results in a res-
trictive monetary policy and assures a decline in inflation in the 
long term. The fiscal restraint is similar to the one described by 
Baxter, except that we replace the level of domestic credit with the 
monetary base.
In the case of Brazil in the early 1960s, it did not make sense to 
apply the restraint to fiscal policy as there was no public bonds mar-
ket. The absence of this market forced the government to turn to 
loans from Banco do Brasil as its primary and near-exclusive source 
of financing for any excessive expenditure. The peculiar position of 
Banco do Brasil in the financial system deserves a special explanation 
because of the implications it has on the money supply. At the time 
there was no true central bank,7 and the role of monetary authority 
was share by Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito (SUMOC) 
and Banco do Brasil. The former was in charge of decisions regarding 
currency and credit, while the latter administered the execution 
of those decisions. By combining the roles of commercial bank and 
financial agent of the monetary authorities, Banco do Brasil gained 
the ability to expand the monetary base through the expansion of its 
deposits. Under these circumstances, credibility should be measured 
based on monetary policy rule under a flexible exchange rate regime.
The Bayesian estimates of the  model were derived from Equation 
(18) using data on the real monetary base (deflated by IPA-DI). We 
used SHAZAM software version 8.0. Following Geweke’s (1986) 
methodology, a prior distribution with inequality constraints was 
used to generate probability values from the posterior distribution. 
These values were used as a measure of credibility of the monetary 
7 The creation of Banco Central da República do Brasil occurred in December 1964.
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policy, as given by Equation (13). To calculate the probability, the 
program uses a Monte Carlo numerical integration procedure which 
is implemented by generating replications from a multivariate t dis-
tribution. The antithetic replication process changes the sign of the 
vector of random numbers. The procedure essentially operates by 
artificially generating samples from a posterior probability density 
function. The proportion of the observations that obey the restraint 
(in this case, θ ≤ 0 ) is the estimate of probability. The estimates of 
the probability incorporated the information from the six months 
prior to each month under study across 200,000 artificial samples 
(100,000 antithetic). The results are given in the chart below.
Credibility of monetary policy: Brazil (1961–64)
The measure of credibility of the monetary policy shows that the 
Jânio Quadros Administration (January 1961 to August 1961) star-
ted with a credibility slightly greater than 8% in January 1961. The 
following months were characterized by a constant increase in cre-
dibility thanks to a commitment to stabilization; this effort was re-
presented by the reform in the exchange system sealed by SUMOC 
Act 204 in March 1961. After Quadros left office, the government’s 
credibility started to decrease.
During the parliamentary period (September 1961 to December 
1962), there was an initial attempt to promote stabilization by the 
first Cabinet led by Tancredo Neves; this effort culminated in the 
so-called “Emergency Action.” These measures were not effective, 
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and the last months of the year reflected a loss in credibility. There 
was a slight gain in credibility as new measures were announced in 
1962, but the frailty of the political framing caused credibility to 
generally decrease. In June, the first Cabinet resigned; the following 
month, credibility fell to approximately 6%. The new Cabinet, led 
by Brochado da Rocha, sketched a new attempt promote to stabi-
lization, but it was destined to fail. The temporary nature of the 
government, created by the demand to move the referendum deter-
mining the system of government to an earlier date, prevented the 
government from persevering in this effort. In September, the mon-
th of the resignation of the second Cabinet, credibility reached its 
lowest level (less than 2%). Finally, the next Cabinet, led by Lima, 
completely submitted to its temporary nature: it acted only to try 
to prevent the worsening of the economic situation.
In 1963, the presidential government of João Goulart showed im-
pressive gains in credibility. These gains were supported by the 
Triennial Plan, which was decidedly orthodox. The results from the 
first months are fairly encouraging. In April, an exchange rate de-
valuation that nearly equalized the official exchange rate and the 
black market rate reflected a change in the level of trust in the 
government. At that point, the government’s credibility nearly rea-
ched 88%. The public debt goal was not reached in the first quarter 
because the norms of financial execution were established only in 
March; however, in the second quarter, the government managed 
to stay within the established limit. The credit policy, although it 
did not meet the fixed nominal goals, achieved contractions in real 
terms in the first two quarters. In the first quarter, real credit was 
reduced by nearly 17%. In the second quarter it shrank by appro-
ximately 4%. The rise in prices after the corrective inflation of the 
first months slowed in April, signaling the possibility of success of 
the stabilization program. In June, credibility reached its highest 
level at approximately 96%.
Nevertheless, the economic difficulties associated with the costs 
of the stabilization program were accompanied by the progressive 
deterioration of political conditions and the increased radicalization 
of competing positions. The tight credit policy and the corrective 
inflation that followed the readjustments of the exchange rate and 
public tariffs made the government very vulnerable to the critiques 
of its opponents. 
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The social costs of maintaining a recessive policy led to the govern-
ment sending ambiguous signals concerning its commitment to stabi-
lization. In the third quarter, the public deficit goal was exceeded by 
over 100%. This quarter marked the beginning of a progressive loss 
of credibility. According to Skidmore (1976, p. 326): “The final blow 
happened when Carvalho Pinto lost his position as Treasury Minister 
in late December. One of the first actions of his successor was to 
agree with the revocation of SUMOC s´ Act.255,8 thus avoiding fi-
nancing the almost dead Plano Trienal.” In December, credibility 
fell below 10%; at this point, the political and economic conditions 
already foreshadowed the institutional rupture that would happen 
in the ensuing year.
5. Conclusion
The analysis of the economic policy of the two political periods 
being studied, known as “populist” governments in the literature, 
follows a certain pattern that is highly similar to the model proposed 
by Barro (1986). This model is based on the governmental dilemma 
between lowering inflation and speeding up growth and stylizes the 
interaction between the government and the private sector as a re-
peated non-cooperative game of incomplete information and finite 
duration. We do not mean to say that Barro’s model is the only ex-
planation for the observed phenomenon. The sequence of events was 
certainly more complex in its economic, political and institutional 
determinants. Additionally, external restrictions certainly influen-
ced economic policy; including them in the analysis aids a broader 
explanation of the impasses and the sequencing of the three phases 
in each of the scenarios examined. However, it seems undeniable 
that the model questions certain interpretations of the economic 
policies implemented in these periods. Therefore, it helps to shed 
light on new angles that contribute to a better understanding of the 
way populism expresses itself in matters of economic policy.
There is a clear sequence of three phases in the two periods 
analyzed. Although determining the exact boundaries of the pha-
8 In October, facing the fast growth of the public deficit, then Minister Carvalho Pinto pro-
posed a system of non-inflationary financing through SUMOC s´ Act.255. It stated that the 
banks that exceeded the authorized limits of credit would be forced to buy Treasury bonds, 
with no interest under a 180-day discharge term.
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ses is a controversial task, it seems without question that the first 
phase of each period started with the advocacy of the need for sta-
bilization policy; importantly, this phase was also characterized by 
a strong rhetorical emphasis on the need for long-term economic 
development. In both of the periods, we see that the economic team 
and the presidency adopted a style of communication advocating 
austerity, trying to convince the economic agents that stabilization 
was a priority. Therefore, it is not reasonable to claim that “populist” 
governments are unable to embrace pro-stability practice or speech: 
the initial phase of each period displayed an emphasis on orthodoxy, 
both in rhetoric and in the handling of economic policy. The existen-
ce of this initial stage, where orthodoxy dominates, contrasts with 
the sequence of stages proposed by Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) 
to describe the populist paradigm. 
The next phase was characterized by the inability of the adminis-
tration in maintaining this emphasis. This shift could have been due 
to the fragility of the political support base in moments of crisis, as 
was the case during the Goulart Administrations. In both periods, 
there was an oscillating policy or randomization phase characteri-
zed by temporary policies. One interpretation of this phase suggests 
that the governments themselves were not willing to completely 
discard the initial stabilization proposal when faced with pressure. 
Instead, they gradually backed away by proposing isolated growth 
policies and loosening goals without immediately abandoning the 
stabilization perspective; perhaps they were trying to make the two 
approaches compatible, which was a fruitless attempt because this 
signaled their sensitivity and vulnerability to external demands. In 
other words, they demonstrated their weakness in the handling of 
economic policy. This exposure created an environment that foste-
red the intensification of inflation and the further fragmentation of 
their support base. Faced with these difficulties, the government 
entered the third phase: they placed a priority on growth, even at 
the cost of higher inflation. 
In light of these observations, the literature’s approaches to analyzing 
these governments and understanding populism in terms of econo-
mic policy may be brought into question. We may delineate several 
implications of our analysis. First, there is a certain logic and cohe-
rence in the economic policies implemented that cannot therefore be 
considered irrational or erratic. Second, orthodoxy is present both 
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in the speech of the government and in its actual implementation 
of the policies, especially in the first phase of each of the periods, 
which precludes characterizing the populist phenomenon as exclusi-
vely promoting growth and disregarding stability. Third, despite its 
availability, the option to seriously fight inflation was not maintained 
throughout either of the analyzed periods. Fourth, the transition 
between the focus on stability and the focus on growth was never 
abrupt; this gradual transition does not support theses that men-
tion a discrete “shift” that could serve as a landmark separating the 
two opposing economic policies. Fifth, pro-development rhetoric 
was present in the three phases of each of the analyzed periods, but 
only in the final phase was growth set as a priority to the complete 
exclusion of stability. Sixth, the pro-development speech in these 
final phases took a rather critical, almost nationalistic, tone. The 
administration usually blamed foreign capital and international or-
ganizations for the deepening of the crisis, taking a radical tone not 
observed in the first stages.
In an attempt to reconcile conflicting interpretations in the litera-
ture about the economic policies of these administrations, we note 
that previous authors emphasized aspects specific to each phase and 
generalized them to the whole, in search of a more comprehensive 
approach. Thus, the authors who emphasized the erratic and irra-
tional character of the policies certainly found their evidence in 
the randomization phase, and those who emphasized the nationalis-
tic and pro-development character found support in the last phase. 
However, we may infer that the “populist economic policy” cannot 
be reduced to any of the phases; in isolation, each phase is unable to 
help untangle such a complex phenomenon. Populism can be better 
understood using the repetitive three-stage pattern revealed in this 
paper. In analyzing the evolution of the events, that is, in modeling 
policy as an interaction between government and the other agents, 
we can distinctly detect a consistent logic in the handling of econo-
mic policy that we might call populist. This logic arises in light of 
concrete and historically determined experiences.
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Appendix 1: Basic Mensal Data
Month Nominal monetarybase (million Cr$)
Inflation index – IPA-DI 
(03/86=100) Real monetary base (÷10.000)
07/1960 269514 0.0004393 61351
08 282114 0.0004609 61209
09 299768 0.0004783 62674
10 311506 0.0005030 61930
11 327938 0.0005156 63603
12 364780 0.0005270 69218
01/1961 377525 0.0005384 70120
02 381114 0.0005366 71024
03 392687 0.0005493 71489
04 390842 0.0005793 67468
05 391725 0.0005877 66654
06 403881 0.0006015 67146
07 406357 0.0006069 66956
08 438045 0.0006430 68125
09 463302 0.0006754 68597
10 486522 0.0007464 65182
11 517507 0.0007788 66449
12 545508 0.0008070 67597
01/1962 546831 0.0008401 65091
02 558493 0.0008563 65222
03 569533 0.0008623 66048
04 593310 0.0008641 68662
05 613166 0.0008972 68342
06 631128 0.0009212 68512
07 678450 0.0009663 70211
08 707553 0.0009831 71972
09 756811 0.0010070 75155
10 831087 0.0010370 80143
11 857301 0.0011170 76750
12 955422 0.0011750 81313
01/1963 939834 0.0012910 72799
02 953086 0.0013800 69064
03 975474 0.0014650 66585
04 978149 0.0014720 66450
05 1040442 0.0015400 67561
06 1065915 0.0016360 65154
07 1084011 0.0016800 64524
08 1165890 0.0017490 66660
09 1270506 0.0018550 68491
10 1315401 0.0019680 66839
11 1399576 0.0020360 68741
12 1613455 0.0021520 74975
Sources: SUMOC Annual Reports (1961-1964) and Conjuntura Econômica (1961-1964)
